Yeah so this is just for testing purposes. Porpoises. Testing reasons and all that.
Okay, good job Zack, you did it. Now let’s actually start writing fr fr.
Get BACK to fucking work. Fricking work.
Yeah so this is just for testing purposes. Porpoises. Testing reasons and all that.
Okay, good job Zack, you did it. Now let’s actually start writing fr fr.
Get BACK to fucking work. Fricking work.
The Vision Pro isn’t failing because the technology isn’t ready. It’s failing because Apple priced it for a market that doesn’t exist yet.
At $3,499, the device sits in a peculiar no-man’s land — too expensive for curious consumers, too limited for enterprise workflows that still run on Windows desktops and Citrix. Apple has historically been willing to create a market through sheer force of product conviction, but that strategy requires volume, and volume requires a price point that doesn’t demand a second mortgage.
Compare this to the AirPods trajectory. First generation: $159. Considered expensive for wireless earbuds at the time. But $159 is an impulse purchase for a meaningful percentage of iPhone owners. $3,499 is not. It’s a deliberate purchase with a spreadsheet attached.
The technology is legitimately impressive. Eye tracking that replaces a mouse. A display resolution that makes text actually readable. Passthrough that doesn’t feel like a surveillance camera strapped to your face. These are hard problems, and Apple solved them. But solving hard problems at a price nobody will pay is an engineering accomplishment, not a product launch.
The second-generation device — whenever it arrives — will need to land below $2,000 to start building the install base that attracts developers, which attracts apps, which makes the case for the consumer. That’s the flywheel. Right now it’s not spinning.
Google won the AI search war before most people noticed there was one.
The narrative for the last two years has been about disruption — Perplexity eating Google’s lunch, ChatGPT making the ten blue links feel ancient, Microsoft finally having its moment after decades of Bing jokes. And there’s something to that story. Google was caught flat-footed. The Bard launch was a disaster. The internal panic was real.
But then a funny thing happened: Google shipped. Gemini Ultra, the NotebookLM pivot, AI Overviews integrated into the search results page, multimodal search that actually works. The product velocity went from embarrassing to genuinely impressive inside of eighteen months.
The structural advantage Google holds is not technology — it’s distribution. Every Android device. Every Chrome browser. Every Gmail user who hits the search bar out of habit. Switching costs in search are low in theory and high in practice. People use what’s in front of them. Google is in front of everyone.
Perplexity is a good product solving a real problem. But it’s fighting for the percentage of users who are deliberate enough about their information tools to go download something different. That’s a real market. It’s not a Google-scale market.
The more interesting question isn’t who wins search. It’s whether search as a category survives in its current form — or whether we’re watching the transition from query-response to something more like a persistent, context-aware assistant layer that happens to answer questions as one of many functions. That’s a fight nobody has won yet.